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Abstract
This paper studies stochastic stability methods applied to processes on general state
spaces. This includes settings in which agents repeatedly interact and choose from
an uncountable set of strategies. Dynamics exist for which the stochastically stable
states differ from those of any reasonable finite discretization. When there are a finite
number of rest points of the unperturbed dynamic, sufficient conditions for analogues
of results from the finite state space literature are derived and studied. Illustrative
examples are given.
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1. Introduction
The occurence of social learning and the convergence of agents’ behavior via pro-
cesses of adaptive behavior is well-documented within economics (e.g. Chong et al.,
2006; Selten and Apesteguia, 2005). The possibility of multiple resting points for
such processes naturally leads one to question which of these stable states is more
plausible from an economic perspective. Strongly influenced by evolutionary game
theory (Smith and Price, 1973), a literature has grown that analyses the robustness
of stable states of social learning dynamics to random errors made by players in their
choice of action (Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993). These ideas have been applied
to a variety of economic situations, including bargaining (Binmore et al., 2003; Naidu
et al., 2010), Nash demand games (Agastya, 1999), exchange economies (Serrano and
Volij, 2008), local interaction on networks and the persistence of altruistic behavior
1I wish to thank Heather Battey, Yossi Feinberg, Johannes Ho¨rner, George Mailath and the
audience at the Econometric Society Australasian Meetings for helpful comments.
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(Eshel et al., 1998).
A common approach when assessing the robustness of stable states of social learn-
ing dynamics has been that pioneered by Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993),
building on the work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). Agents are assumed to make
errors independently and when they do make an error are assumed to play a strategy
chosen at random from a distribution with full support on a finite set of strategies.
This imposes a mathematical structure on the process that leads to clear and appeal-
ing characterization results.
Unfortunately, such results cannot be straightforwardly applied when agents’ have
non-finite sets of strategies.3 Even assuming the convergence of the underlying social
learning dynamic, the addition of random errors can lead to behavior which hinders
efforts to obtain a clear cut characterization of the long run pattern of play. This
paper takes up the task of analysing the problems and intricacies which arise and,
when there are a finite number of rest points of the underlying dynamic, determines a
set of sufficient conditions which enable existing results to be applied to models with
continuous state spaces. These conditions include a continuity requirement on error
distributions and players’ responses as a function of the current state, an asymptotic
stability-like condition and a condition which ensures a specific type of discontinuity
does not occur at rest points of the underlying dynamic. Examples are given showing
how no subset of the conditions is sufficient on its own.
Fortunately, all of these conditions are satisfied for many common models found
in economics. Typical error distributions of the kind described above coupled with
the continuous best responses found in many models of industrial organization will
often satisfy all of the conditions. This study applies the theory to linear quadratic
games and to population models in the style of Kandori et al. (1993).
A related paper is that of Feinberg (2006) which also looks at discrete time,
continuous state space processes. However, the paper in question imposes the strong
condition that the perturbed process be governed by transition probabilities that are
continuous functions of the current state of the process. The bulk of the analysis in
the current paper concerns situations where this is not the case. Moreover, Feinberg
3An early paper in the literature (Foster and Young, 1990) has an infinite state space and a
continuous time dynamic in which perturbations are modelled as a Wiener process. However, it
differs markedly from the majority of the literature, in which the error distributions are irrelevant
to the stability results as long as they have full support.
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considers a particular unperturbed dynamic and state space, whereas the current
paper is more general in its scope. Schenk-Hoppe´ (2000) adapts the results of Freidlin
and Wentzell (1984) and Ellison (2000) for use in finding stochastically stable states
in a continuous strategy oligopoly model equipped with an imitation dynamic.
By considering finite state spaces, Young (1993) dispenses with the need for
regularity assumptions found in treatments of perturbed dynamics by Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984); Kifer (1988, 1990). Specifically, all finite state spaces are compact,
continuity requirements become unnecessary, and the probability of non-convergence
to some stable state in given finite time need no longer be bounded by a function of
error probabilities. The treatment of the current paper incorporates some finiteness
in that the set of orders of magnitude of one step transition probabilities is taken to
be finite. This allows us to use weaker continuity requirements on transition proba-
bilities. We also dispense with compactness assumptions on the state space. From an
economics perspective this enables, for example, the use of the Cartesian plane as the
state space and the use of error probabilities which are independent across players.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the ideas of the paper
via two motivating examples. Section 3 describes the processes of interest, gives
convergence results, looks at transition probabilities between stable states, and defines
a useful regularity property, showing how this property allows the problems associated
with infinite state spaces to be circumvented. Section 4 gives sufficient conditions for
this property to hold and discusses each of the conditions, giving examples of the
problems which arise if any condition fails to hold. Section 5 gives examples. Section
6 solves an example from Section 2 for which our regularity condition fails to hold.
Section 7 concludes. Formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. Motivating examples
This paper focuses on situations where agents follow some rule when deciding
how to behave. The rule can be deterministic or random, cautious or hasty, imitative
or best responding: any kind of behavioral bias or irregularity can be represented.
Usually the rule is adaptive in the sense that an agent’s behavior is intended to
improve his lot. What really matters is that the rule has the Markov property: the
past per se does not affect the future, although features of the present shaped by
the past, including memories, are allowed to do so. We analyse situations where
behavior over time will converge towards one of a number of stable states. As long
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as there is some probability of convergence to more than one stable state, this is
predictively awkward. The possibility of random errors or idiosyncratic play justifies
the introduction of perturbed versions of the process which help in obtaining long run
predictions. There is a well-developed literature which deals with these problems for
finite state spaces4, so the first question that must be addressed is whether there is
benefit to be had from dealing directly with processes on general state spaces, rather
than with finite discrete approximations.
2.1. Discretization can fail to represent the original process accurately
There is not always a suitable finite discretization of a process available. To
illustrate, we present the following example. Consider a Markov process with state
space X = [0, 1] ⊂ R endowed with the Euclidean distance metric. Let the process be
governed by the Markov kernel P (., .). The Markov kernel is a generalized analogue
of transition probabilities on Markov chains. P (x,A) gives the probability with which
the process moves from state x to any state within a set of states A. For notational
ease, for y ∈ X, we identify P (., y) := P (., {y}). Let P (x, x2) = 1. This process
has a set of stable states Λ = {0, 1}: from x∗ ∈ Λ, P (x∗, x∗) = 1. We examine a
perturbed variant of the process in which each period, with probability 1 − ε the
unperturbed process is followed, and with probability ε the new state is drawn from
the uniform distribution U [[0, 1]]. This perturbed process has an invariant measure piε
which converges to a measure with all weight on {0} as ε→ 0: the set of stochastically
stable5 states is {0}.
Any discretized state space and process should satisfy some properties in order for
it to be a reasonable representation of the original process. We suggest the following
as reasonable restrictions on the discretized state space X∆ ⊆ X and the discretized
unperturbed process P∆(., .): (a) From a state x ∈ X∆, if a set A ⊆ X is reached
with positive probability under the original process, then the closest states to A in X∆
(under the original metric) are reached with positive probability under the discretized
process P∆(., .); (b) If, from a state x ∈ X∆, under the original process the set of
states in X which are closer to z ∈ X∆ than to any other point in X∆ is never
4See also Bergin and Lipman (1996); van Damme and Weibull (2002); Beggs (2005).
5The use of the term ‘stochastic stability’ in the economics literature refers almost exclusively
to states with positive weight under some limiting measure. Other uses of the term appear in the
literature on dynamic processes. This paper follows the economic usage.
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reached with positive probability, then z is never reached with positive probability
under the discretized process; (c) Stable states of the original process are states of
the discretized process and therefore stable states of the discretized process by (b).
We take as a discretization of the perturbation (the uniform distribution on X)
any distribution on X∆ that places positive probability on all states in X∆. Now,
for any finite discretization satisfying our conditions, as ε→ 0, the limit of piε places
positive probability on all states in {0, 1}: discretizing the process has given us one
additional stochastically stable state.6
Finding the stochastically stable states of the original process in this section turns
out to be simple. The reason for this is that far enough along any convergent path
to a stable state, the probability under the perturbed process of moving to the basin
of attraction of another given stable state is of constant order of ε. For example,
from any convergent path to 0 under the unperturbed process P (., .), at any given
future period t the probability under the perturbed process of being in the basin of
attraction of state is 1 is of order ε∞ = 0. There do not exist convergent paths to 0
with escape probabilities of different orders of ε. We shall define Property C as the
absence of multiple paths which converge to the same stable state and have different
orders of escape probability. When Property C holds, we show that variants of results
used heavily in the finite state space stochastic stability literature can be used. An
important part of the current paper gives sufficient conditions under which Property
C holds.
2.2. Multiple convergent paths
The next example can be considered as a model in which there are two possible
focal points for a social norm. There are n agents who contribute some real amount
of effort towards the provision of a public good. If at least some threshold number
of agents contribute at least some focal amount (which we take to be 1), then agents
converge towards that level of contribution. Otherwise they converge towards a zero
contribution. Consider a state space X = [0, xmax]
n ⊂ Rn+, xmax > 1, n ∈ N. Let
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X denote a representative element. Define I(x) as the set of
6It may be remarked that, for this example, there exist sequences of finite discretizations such
that the limit (of the sequence of discretizations) of the limits (as ε → 0) of piε converges to the
stochastically stable states of the original process. Such a sequence does not always exist, as is
apparent from the example in Section 2.2.
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players who contribute at least 1 in a given state x:
I(x) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : xi ≥ 1}.
For some k < n, k ∈ N, we define P (., .) as follows:
If |I(x)| < k then P
(
x,
x
2
)
= 1
If |I(x)| ≥ k then P
(
x,
x+ 1n
2
)
= 1.
The process has stable states Λ = {0n, 1n}. We examine a perturbed variant of the
process in which each period, with probability 1 −∑ni=1 εi the unperturbed process
is followed, and with probability εi the new state is drawn from the distribution:
Gi(x, .) ∼ U [{x¯ ∈ X : (|{r : xr = x¯r}| = n− i)}].
That is, with probability εi, exactly i agents randomly choose their contribution
from a uniform distribution on [0, xmax]. There exist convergent paths to 1
n with
|I(x)| ∈ {k, k + 1, . . . n}. From a convergent path to 1n for which |I(x)| = k, a move
to the basin of attraction of 0n in a single period is an event with probability of
order ε. From a convergent path to 1n for which |I(x)| = n, a move to the basin
of attraction of 0n in a single period is an event with probability of order εn−k+1.
Property C does not hold. The only stochastically stable state of this process turns
out to be 0n. Showing that this is the case is complicated by Property C not holding,
so recourse to more general methods is necessary (see Section 6). For completeness,
we note that if k < n− k+ 1, then any reasonable finite discretization of the process
leads to 1n being selected as the unique stochastically stable state.
3. A general model of perturbed adaptive behavior
A very general model is presented: the unperturbed dynamic can be any Markov
process on any separable metric space, the only assumption being the nonemptiness
of, and convergence of the process to, a set of stable states. The perturbed model
then allows a broad class of perturbations which includes independent random errors
such as are found in the traditional stochastic stability literature, but also allows
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correlated errors and any type of state dependent behavior.7
3.1. Quantitative characterization
The first step is to model an unperturbed dynamic which gives the behavior of
agents in the absence of random perturbations. Let Φ be a Markov process on a
separable metric space X with kernel P (x,A), x ∈ X, A ∈ B(X), where B(X) is the
Borel σ-algebra.
Definition 1. The set of stable states is defined:
Λ := {x ∈ X : P (x, x) = 1}.
Assumption 1.
Λ 6= ∅, Λ is closed.
Definition 2. The basin of attraction Wi of x
∗
i ∈ Λ is:
Wi :=
{
x ∈ X : for every open V ⊃ {x∗i }, P t(x, V )→ 1 as t→∞
}
.
Define W :=
⋃
iWi. Let W
δ
i := Wi ∩ Bδ(x∗i ) and W δ :=
⋃
iW
δ
i , where Bδ(x)
is the open ball of radius δ centred at x. We now introduce an assumption which
guarantees that wherever you start in the state space you end up arbitrarily close to
some element of Λ — the unperturbed process Φ converges to a stable state. This
assumption is necessary to the purpose of this paper, which is to give tools by which
to select from several stable states. If convergence were not assumed, then equilibrium
selection would become a secondary issue.
Assumption 2 (Convergence).
∀ δ > 0, x ∈ X, ∃Tδ such that P t(x,W δ) = 1 for all t ≥ Tδ.
Note, from any x ∈ X, it is assumed that convergence occurs in bounded time.
Boundedness is unnecessary when state spaces are finite as analysis in such a case
7For example, perturbations could include coalitional behavior such as that found in Newton
(2012), depend on relative payoffs as in Blume (1993), or show some degree of intentionality as in
Naidu et al. (2010).
7
can proceed without a distinction being drawn between stable and unstable states.
Inertia can still be modeled under processes satisfying Assumption 2, but it will always
be a finite amount of inertia.8
Φ can be taken to represent some unperturbed dynamic which describes the evo-
lution of the strategies of players in a game, with each entry in a vector x ∈ X
describing the strategy chosen by a player in some previous time period. In this con-
text the kernel P (x,A) can be taken to be some sort of (not necessarily continuous)
best response or imitation dynamic. Let {Φε}ε, ε ∈ (0, 1), be a family of Markov
processes on the state space X with kernels Pε(x,A). Define:
Pε(x,A) =
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)
P (x,A) +
M−1∑
i=1
εiGi(x,A) + ε
MGM(A)
where M ∈ N, Gi(x, .), GM(.) are probability measures on B(X). For A ∈ B(X),
Gi(., A) are non-negative B(X)-measurable functions on X. As a sum of B(X)-
measurable functions, Pε(., A) is B(X)-measurable. Note that Pε(x,X) = 1 is satis-
fied. {Φε}ε is a subset of the class of Puiseux Markov processes. It is not necessary
for the powers of ε to be integers, but here they are assumed so for expositional ease.
Note that perturbations according to Gi occur with probabilities that approach zero
at rate εi as ε is taken to zero.9
In the most common models of stochastic stability, which we refer to as inde-
pendent error models (Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993), the state is composed of
strategy profiles, each player has an independent probability of making an error with
probability ε and players who make errors play strategies chosen from a given dis-
tribution with full support. Such a process satisfies the definition above.10 We now
show that for any given value of ε, Φε has a unique invariant measure. This measure
is predictive in the sense that it gives the frequencies with which given sets of states
will be observed in the long run.
8For example a state (x, n) /∈ Λ could proceed with positive probability to a state (x, n+ 1) /∈ Λ
up to (x, n¯) for some, possibly very large, n¯ ∈ N.
9Setting ε = e
−1
η , the processes in this paper satisfy: limη→0 η logPη(x, U) = − infy∈U ρ(x, y) for
open sets U and a function ρ(., .) : X × X → R. ρ(., .) is not necessarily continuous and so does
not necessarily satisfy the conditions of Kifer (1990). For example, independent error models do not
satisfy continuity of ρ(., .).
10Independent error models do not have Pε(x,A) continuous in x for any given A ∈ B(X) and so
do not satisfy the assumptions of Feinberg (2006).
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Proposition 1. Φε has a unique invariant probability measure piε.
Proposition 2. For all x ∈ X,
sup
A∈B(X)
|P tε(x,A)− piε(A)| → 0 as t→∞.
The independence of GM(.) from x makes GM(.) an irreducibility measure. That
is, from any x ∈ X, any A ∈ B(X) such that GM(A) > 0 will eventually be reached by
the process. The presence of the GM(.) term in Pε(., .) is sufficient, but not necessary,
for the existence of a unique invariant measure and ergodicity. In fact, for several
examples later in the paper, the analysis is independent of GM(.).
3.2. Invariant measures when perturbations are rare
In the preceding subsection it was shown that Φε has a unique invariant measure piε
which depends on ε. In order to predict long term behavior under small perturbations
it helps to analyse the limit as ε→ 0. In the following proposition it is shown that as
ε gets small, piε places arbitrarily small probability mass on sets of states which are
not close to the stable states of the unperturbed process. As all of our measures have
B(X) as their domain and all our functions are B(X)-measurable, the proof can use
the property that an integral over a sum of measures is equal to the sum of integrals
over those measures.11
Proposition 3. For any η ∈ (0, 1], A ∈ B(X) such that Λ ∩ cl(A) = ∅ there exists εˆ
such that piε(A) < η for all ε < εˆ.
Corollary 1. If pi is a limiting measure (in the sense of weak convergence of mea-
sures) of piε as ε → 0, then pi is an invariant measure of the unperturbed process
Φ.
So, the addition of perturbations to the model can be seen as a way of selecting
between the alternative invariant measures of the unperturbed process. We now move
to find conditions under which processes on a general state space can be analyzed
using similar tools to those used in the finite state space literature. The following
assumption is made:
11See Fremlin (2001), 234H(c).
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Assumption 3.
|Λ| <∞.
Cases for which |Λ| = ∞ can sometimes be analyzed using a careful application
of the results of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).12 Note that |Λ| < ∞ implies that
Λ = {x∗1, . . . x∗ν} for some ν ∈ N. Limiting invariant measures in many examples turn
out to place all of the probability mass on a single stable state, predicting that in the
long run the process should be observed to be at or near that state almost all of the
time.
Definition 3. Stable states x∗ ∈ Λ with pi(x∗) > 0 are called stochastically stable.
The rest of the paper devotes itself to the question of how to find stochastically
stable states and the analysis of intricacies that can arise due to having an infinite
state space.
3.3. Transition probabilities between stable states
In order to find stochastically stable states it will be necessary to determine the
magnitudes of the transition probabilities between the basins of attraction of different
stable states. These magnitudes are given as powers of ε. The following Bachmann-
Landau asymptotic notation expresses the idea of f being bounded below by g.
f(ε) ∈ Ω(g(ε))⇔ ∃k > 0, ε¯ s.t. ∀ ε < ε¯, kg(ε) ≤ |f(ε)|
Define:
V (x∗k, x
∗
j) := inf
{
i : ∀x ∈ Wk,
(∃t : P tε(x,Wj) ∈ Ω(εi))} ∧∞
V −(x∗k, x
∗
j) := inf
{
i : ∀δ > 0, ∃x ∈ W δk :
(∃t : P tε(x,Wj) ∈ Ω(εi))} ∧∞
which can be interpreted as resistances measuring the difficulty of moving from the
basin of attraction of x∗k to the basin of attraction of x
∗
j . V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j) and V
−(x∗k, x
∗
j)
measure respectively the most unlikely and easiest way in which a move from close to
x∗k to Wj could occur. The values of V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j) and V
−(x∗k, x
∗
j) will depend on which
12See Section 6, the appendix, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (2000) for an introduction to the ideas involved.
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error distributions Gi are used along paths between neighborhoods of the two stable
states.
The following assumption dictates that from starting points close to any stable
state, the process far enough in the future cannot be too likely to be at a state from
which convergence times are very large. Reaching such states cannot be easier than
reaching the basins of attraction of other stable states.
Assumption 4 (Fast Convergence). Let
Fδ(t) := {x ∈ X : P t(x,W δ) < 1}, V¯i := max
j:V −(x∗i ,x
∗
j )<∞
V −(x∗i , x
∗
j).
Then
∃δ, Tδ+ : ∀x∗i ∈ Λ, x ∈ W δi , @t : P tε(x, Fδ(Tδ+)) ∈ Ω(εV¯i−1).
Note that if there is a uniform bound on convergence times, that is the Tδ in As-
sumption 2 do not depend on x, then setting Tδ+ = Tδ, we have that Fδ(Tδ+) = ∅, so
Assumption 4 is satisfied.
A regularity property is now defined that allows a single magnitude of transition
probability to characterize transitions from states within the basin of attraction of,
and close to, one stable state to the basin of attraction of another stable state. We
shall further require that the appropriate orders of transition probabilities can occur
within a bounded number of periods T 13, and that there exists some uniform lower
bound on transition probabilities for given ε.14
Definition 4 (Property C). Property C is said to hold when V (x∗k, x
∗
j) = V
−(x∗k, x
∗
j)
for all x∗k, x
∗
j ∈ Λ, and moreover, for V (x∗k, x∗j) 6= ∞, there exists δkj > 0, Tkj ∈ N+,
l > 0 such that ∀x ∈ W δkjk , ∃t ≤ Tkj such that P tε(x,Wj) ≥ lεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ).
The convergence of the unperturbed process to stable states (Assumption 2) en-
sures that, for small ε, the process spends almost all of the time close to stable states.
13This will eliminate the possibility of the existence of an infinite sequence {x(i)}i∈N converging
to x∗k such that limi→∞min{t ∈ N+ : P tε(x(i),Wj) ∈ Ω(εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ))} → ∞. If such a sequence existed,
there could exist a distribution on Wk such that on entering Wk according to this distribution the
process would have infinite expected waiting time until an escape probability of order Ω(εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ))
is possible.
14This eliminates the possibility of the existence of an infinite sequence {x(i)}i∈N converging to
x∗k such that limi→∞ inf{l ∈ R++ : PTε (x(i),Wj) ≥ lεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j )} → 0.
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Property C allows a single value to characterize the order of magnitude of transition
probabilities between these small neighborhoods of stable states. A strengthening of
convergence assumptions (Assumption 4) enables us equate these probabilities to the
probabilities which govern the related process which is only observed when the state
is close to a stable state. As there are a finite number of stable states, the problem of
determining the stochastically stable states is reduced to a discrete problem: the sets
W δk for which piε(W
δ
k ) 9 0 as ε → 0 are determined solely by the values of V (., .).
Analogues of results from the finite state space stochastic stability literature can then
be used.
3.4. Characterization restated for infinite state spaces
Let L = {1, . . . , ν} index the states in Λ. A graph on L is an i-graph if each j 6= i
has a single exiting directed edge, and the graph has no cycles. Let G(i) denote the
set of all i-graphs. Define:
V(i) = min
g∈G(i)
∑
(k→j)∈g
V (x∗k, x
∗
j),
Lmin = {i ∈ L : V(i) = min
j∈L
V(j)}.
Note that it is possible that V(i) = ∞ for some, but not all, i ∈ L. An analogue of
the key result of Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993) can now be stated.
Proposition 4. If Property C holds then:
pi(x∗i ) > 0⇔ i ∈ Lmin
The proof analyzes the process restricted to small neighborhoods of stable states.
The invariant probability measure of the restricted process is a restriction and scaling
of the invariant measure of the original process. For fixed ε, from any state, any
of these neighborhoods which have positive invariant measure can be reached with
positive probability in bounded time. This allows the construction of a finite state
space Markov chain with invariant measure equal to the invariant measure of the
restricted process. Property C gives that the order of the transition probabilities of
this chain are precisely εV (.,.), and the finite problem can be solved.15
15As a consequence of Proposition 4, “radius-coradius” results (Ellison, 2000, citing a no longer
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4. Sufficient conditions for Property C
Given the usefulness of Property C in allowing the use of an analagous character-
ization to that in the finite state space literature, a natural question to ask is under
what conditions it holds and whether or not these conditions are plausible and com-
monly satisfied. The next proposition concerns itself with finding sufficient conditions
for Property C.
Proposition 5 gives conditions for Property C that can be satisfied by independent
error models of stochastic stability. This is important as such models are commonly
found in the literature. Firstly, a continuity requirement is placed on the unperturbed
dynamic and the error distributions. For the unperturbed dynamic, this requirement
is implied by the weak Feller property P (y, .)⇒ P (x, .) as y → x, corresponding in a
game theoretic context to continuity of the response correspondence of the underlying
game. For the error distributions, the requirement is satisfied by independent error
models. Secondly, a condition weaker than, but similar to, asymptotic stability is
imposed in the neighbourhoods of the stable states. Thirdly, a condition is given which
restricts the behaviour of the process at a stable state according to the behaviour of
the process at nearby states. Following the statement of the proposition, a series of
examples illustrates the role of each condition.
First, define an attainability property for each x∗ ∈ Λ which holds when there is a
positive probability of ending up spending time in the basin of attraction of x∗ when
the initial state is distributed according to GM(.).
Definition 5 (Attainable stable states). For a given stable state x∗i , let
Bi = {x ∈ X : ∃t s.t. P tε(x,Wi) > 0}.
Define the set of attainable stable states A = {x∗i ∈ Λ : GM(Bi) > 0}.
Definition 6. The basin of possible attraction Wi of x∗i ∈ Λ is:
Wi :=
{
x ∈ X :
∞∑
t=1
P t(x,Wi) > 0
}
available paper of Evans, 1993), which follow immediately from the i-graph characterization of
stochastically stable states, will also hold when appropriately restated.
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Figure 1: Example: (i) does not hold for P (., .).
DefineWδj :=Wj ∩Bδ(x∗j). Condition (ii) of Proposition 5 is implied by (but does
not imply) asymptotic stability under Φ of any x∗ ∈ A. Note that x∗i ∈ Λ \A implies
piε(Wi) = 0.
Proposition 5. If the following conditions hold then Property C holds.
(i) For all A ∈ B(X) open, x1 ∈ X, there exists δAx1 > 0, ξAx1 > 0, such that if
x2 ∈ X satisfies d(x1, x2) < δAx1 then:
P (x1, A) > 0⇒ P (x2, A) > ξAx1
Gi(x1, A) > 0⇒ Gi(x2, A) > ξAx1 , i = 1, . . . ,M − 1
(ii) For all x∗i ∈ A, there exists δ˜ > 0 such that W δ˜i is open.
(iii) For all x∗j , x
∗
k ∈ Λ, ∃ t:
P tε(x
∗
k,Wj) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j ))
A sketch of the proof is as follows. Take a finite path from x∗k to Wj. Condition
(iii) ensures that no easier path to Wj exists from any points in Wk which are close
enough to x∗k. Condition (i), used iteratively, shows that from points close to x
∗
k, simi-
lar paths can be followed with similar probabilities. Condition (ii) ensures that paths
which are similar enough to the original path must enter Wj, wherefrom the unper-
turbed dynamic can reach Wj. Note that if convergence time is uniformly bounded
as described after the statement of Assumption 4, then Condition (iii) automatically
holds (see Lemma 8 in the appendix). The rest of this section consists of stylized
examples designed to demonstrate how Property C can fail if any of the conditions
of Proposition 5 do not hold.
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4.1. Example: (i) does not hold for the unperturbed dynamic
Define X = [0, 1]3. Let the unperturbed process Φ represent a game played
repeatedly by 3 players with strategy spaces [0, 1]. Each period each player plays a
best response to the actions of the other two players in the previous period. Define
Ci =
(
3
4
1
2i
, 1
2i
]
. Define C =
⋃∞
i=1Ci. Let Bi =
(
1
2
1
2i
, 3
4
1
2i
]
, B =
⋃∞
i=1Bi. Let best
response correspondences be symmetric and anonymous:
BR(a, b) =

Ci+1, if a ∈ Ci, b /∈ Cj for some i, j
Ci+1, if a ∈ Ci, b ∈ Cj for some i, j, i ≥ j
1, if a ∈ (1
2
, 1], b /∈ C
Bi+1, if a ∈ Bi, b ∈ Bj for some i, j, i ≥ j
0, if a = 0, b ∈ B ∪ {0}.
Note that x∗0 = (0, 0, 0) and x
∗
1 = (1, 1, 1) are the only stable states of the unper-
turbed dynamic. Let the perturbed process Φε be such that each player independently
with probability ε plays an action chosen randomly from [0, 1] instead of playing a
best response. V (x∗0, x
∗
1) = 3. V
−(x∗0, x
∗
1) = 1. There is in effect one convergent path
to x∗0 via states in B×B×B from which it is easy to escape and another convergent
path via states in C × C × C from which it is difficult to escape. As ε→ 0, piε ⇒ pi
where pi((0, 0, 0)) = 1.
Intuitively, (i) not holding for P (., .) carries the implication that even when two
states are extremely close to one another there is no guarantee that similar random
shocks will lead to similar responses by the players. It is always possible to choose two
states x1, x2 arbitrarily close to one another such that from x1 a single player choosing
a given random action would lead to completely different short run behaviour of the
process to that which would occur if from x2 exactly the same player chose exactly
the same random action.
4.2. Example: (i) does not hold for error distributions
Let X = [0, 1]. Let there be two stable states x∗k = 0, x
∗
j = 1, let Wi ⊃ Bδ(x∗i ) for
some δ, i = j, k, so (ii) is satisfied. For x ∈ Wk, let P (x, x/10) = 1. The error process
guarantees that (iii) is satisfied:
G1(x, x) = 1, if the first non-zero digit in the decimal expansion of x is 1.
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G1(x,Wj) = 1, otherwise
G2(Wj) = G2(Wk) =
1
2
Then V −(x∗k, x
∗
j) = 1 and V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j) = 2 no matter whether or not (i) is satisfied by
P (., .).
4.3. Example: (ii) does not hold
Figure 2: Example: (ii) does not hold.
Define X = [0, 1]2. Let (x, y) describe an element of the state space. Let:
P
(
(x, y),
(
x
2
, y + min
{
1
2
, y
}
(1− y)
))
= 1
then there are 2 stable states, x∗k = (0, 1) and x
∗
j = (0, 0). Let:
A = {(x, y) ∈ X : y = 0}
G1(x,A) =
1
2
for x ∈ U := {(x, y) ∈ X : x+ 2y ≥ 2} ,
and let G1(x, .) be uniform on X otherwise. Let G2(A) = 1. Then (i) and (iii) hold
but V −(x∗k, x
∗
j) = 1 and V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j) = 2. Intuitively, although (i) implies that from any
16
point close to x∗k but not in U it is possible to reach any point arbitrarily close to
x∗j with a probability of order ε, (ii) not holding means that this is not sufficient for
convergence to x∗j and the process ends up reconverging towards x
∗
k.
4.4. Example: (iii) does not hold
Figure 3: Example: (iii) does not hold. Although convergent paths to (0, 0) within A only require
an order of ε transition to reach Wj , convergent paths within B require an order of ε
2 transition.
So Wj cannot always be reached with Ω(ε) probabilities.
Define X = [0, 1]× [−1, 1]. Let (x, y) describe an element of the state space. Let:
P
(
(x, y),
(x
2
,
y
2
))
=
max
{
0, 3
5
− x, 1
2
− y}
max
{
0, 3
5
− x, 1
2
− y}+ max{0,min{x− 2
5
, y
}}
P
(
(x, y),
(
x+ 1
2
,
y + 1
2
))
=
max
{
0,min
{
x− 2
5
, y
}}
max
{
0, 3
5
− x, 1
2
− y}+ max{0,min{x− 2
5
, y
}}
then there are 2 stable states, x∗k = (0, 0) and x
∗
j = (1, 1). Note that under the
unperturbed dynamic the process will in each period move in a straight line towards
one of the stable states. Let:
G1((x, y), .) ∼ U [{(x′, y′) : x′ = x or y′ = y}]
G2(.) ∼ U [X]
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Then (i) and (ii) hold but V −(x∗k, x
∗
j) = 1 and V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j) = 2. Although there exists
a convergent path to x∗k from which Wj can be reached with a probability of order ε
(such as those in Area A in Figure 3), the limit x∗k does not have this property and so
we cannot rule out the existence of convergent paths with lower escape probabilities
(such as those in Area B in the figure).
5. Economic examples
5.1. Linear quadratic games
We apply the theory to two player games with strategies yi ∈ R+ and the following
payoff functions:
ui(yi, yj) = aiy
2
i + biyiyj + ciyi + diyj, ai, bi < 0; ci > 0; ai, bi, ci, di ∈ R.
This class of games includes public goods problems with strategic substitutes and
Cournot duopolies with linear demand and quadratic costs. Oechssler and Riedel
(2001) showed that under the replicator dynamic with symmetric payoff functions
such games converge to the interior equilibrium in which players play yinti =
bicj−2ciaj
4aiaj−bibj
16.
We assume a multiplicity of equilibria: yinti > 0 so that xI = (y
int
1 , y
int
2 ) is a Nash equi-
librium; 4aiaj < bibj so that corner equilibria exist: xc1 = (y
cnr
1 , 0), xc2 = (0, y
cnr
2 ),
ycnri =
−ci
2ai
. Let the unperturbed dynamic be a Markov process on X = R2+ in which
each period one player best responds to the current action of the other player, fol-
lowing which the other player best responds to the new action of the first player. Let
the metric on X be Euclidean distance. The best response of player i to yj is
BRi(yj) = max
{−biyj − ci
2ai
, 0
}
Φ has kernel:
P ((yi, yj), (BRi(yj), BRj(BRi(yj)))) =
1
2
, i = 1, 2.
This gives:
WI = {xI}, Wci = {(yi, yj) : yi > yinti , yj < yintj },
16yinti =
−c
2a+b under symmetry.
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WI = {(yi, yj) : yi = yinti or yj = yintj }, Wci = {(yi, yj) : yi > yinti or yj < yintj }.
Note that P (., .) satisfies condition (i) of Proposition 5. We analyse two possible
perturbed dynamics.
5.1.1. Uniform local perturbations
For some small ς > 0, define:
G1((y1, y2), .) ∼ U [Bς((y1, y2))]
Gn((y1, y2), .) =
∫
X
G1((y1, y2), dx)Gn−1(x, .), n = 2, . . . ,M − 1
GM((0, 0)) = 1.
These Gn(., .), GM(.) satisfy condition (i) of Proposition 5. GM(.) is not necessary
for the results of this section, although it is of interest to note that any Markovian
dynamic with some small, bounded below, probability of an ‘armageddon’ event will
satisfy the conditions for ergodicity. A = {xc1, xc2} and it is clear that for some
δ > 0, Wδci are open so condition (ii) is also satisfied. For almost all values of ς, for
any escape path from a state close to xci to Wδcj there is a similar path from xci itself
to Wδcj, so condition (iii) is generically satisfied17,18. Now, the order of perturbations
required to move from near xci to Wcj is given by:
V (xci, xcj) =
⌈
min
{
yintj
ς
,
ycnri − yinti
ς
}⌉
and applying Proposition 4 we obtain:
Proposition 6.
min
{
yintj , y
cnr
i − yinti
} ≥ min{yinti , ycnrj − yintj } ⇐⇒
∃ ςˆ such that ∀ ς < ςˆ, pi(xci) > 0
17The exception to this is when an expression for V (xci, xcj) would be an integer even before the
ceiling function is applied.
18Thus Assumption 4 is satisfied as for any δ,γ > 0, for large enough t, Fδ(t) ⊆ {(y1, y2) :
mini∈{1,2} d(yi, yinti ) < γ}. So for small enough δ and γ, correspondingly large t˜, x ∈ W δi , we have
that P tε(x, Fδ(t˜)) is of the order of ε
V (x∗i ,x
∗
j ) for all t.
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5.1.2. Proportional perturbations
For some k ∈ (0, 1), define:
G1((y1, y2), .) ∼ U [[ky1, y1]× [ky2, y2]]
Gn((y1, y2), .) =
∫
X
G1((y1, y2), dx)Gn−1(x, .), n = 2, . . . ,M − 1
GM((0, 0)) = 1.
Similarly to above, conditions (i),(iii),(iv) are satisfied. Now:19
V (xci, xcj) =

log
(
yinti
ycnri
)
log k

and applying Proposition 4 we obtain:
Proposition 7.
ycnri
yinti
≥ y
cnr
j
yintj
⇐⇒ ∃ kˆ : ∀ k > kˆ, pi(xci) > 0
5.2. Sampling a population
Take a two player symmetric matrix game in which a player has a set N of possible
actions, |N | = n. Let there be a continuum of agents on the unit interval. The state
space is defined as the proportions in which each action is played at a point in time:
X is the unit (n − 1)-simplex. In period t, independently of his previous actions,
with probability 1− α any given agent plays the same action as at time t− 1. With
probability α he randomly and uniformly samples a finite number k of the actions of
players in period t−1 before playing a best response to the mixed strategy which has
each action being played with a probability equal to its proportion in his sample. If
multiple best responses exist we assume that they are chosen with equal probability.
Denote the distribution of such best responses to an action profile x by BR(x). Then:
P (x, x˜) = 1, x˜ := (1− α)x+ αBR(x).
19V (xci, xcj) is the lowest integer V such that k
V ycnri < y
int
i .
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Note that as the probability of drawing any given sample is continuous in x, P (x, .)
is itself continuous and does not violate condition (i) of Proposition 5. We restrict
attention to games for which this process satisfies Assumption 2. It is trivial to
construct games which do not satisfy Assumption 2 under this process, for example
the 2 by 2 matrix of zeroes.
Any stable state x∗ is close to a Nash equilibrium of Γ in the following sense:
Proposition 8. For any ξ > 0, there exists k¯ ∈ N+ such that if k > k¯, for any
x∗ ∈ Λ there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium xNE of Γ such that |x∗−xNE| < ξ.
The perturbations are defined as follows. For some small ς > 0, define:
G1(x, .) ∼ U [Bς(x)]
Gn(x, .) =
∫
X
G1(x, dy)Gn−1(y, .), n = 2, . . . ,M − 1
GM(.) ∼ U [X]
These Gn(., .), GM(.) satisfy condition (i) of Proposition 5. GM(.) is not necessary for
the results of this section.
Proposition 9. If xNE is a strict symmetric pure Nash equilibrium then:
xNE ∈ A and xNE is asymptotically stable.
L R
L a, a b, c
R c, b d, d
Figure 4: A two player strategic game. (L,L) and (R,R) assumed to be strict Nash equilibria.
In a game such as that of Figure 4 in which there are two strict symmetric Nash
equilibria, by Proposition 9 both of these Nash equilibria correspond to stable states
in A such that the basin of attraction includes some open ball centred on the Nash
equilibrium. Close to the mixed Nash equilibrium, for large enough k, there is one
stable state which is not in A. Hence condition (ii) of Proposition 5 is satisfied. Let
(p, 1 − p) be the equilibrium strategy of the mixed Nash equilibrium. Then as long
21
as neither p nor 1 − p is an integer multiple of ς, condition (iii) is also satisfied.20,21
Identical arguments to those in Young (1998) then give:
Proposition 10. In a 2 by 2 game with two symmetric strict pure Nash equilibria,
one of which is risk dominant, the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely stochastically
stable for small δ.
6. What if Property C does not hold?
Analysis is less straightforward if Property C does not hold. In some cases, how-
ever, a simple argument can still be used to find stochastically stable states. In the
example in Section 2.2, Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 5 all fail at state
1n. Property C does not hold as V −(1n, 0n) = 1 whereas V (1n, 0n) = n − k + 1.
However, the state space can still be partitioned into a finite collection of disjoint
sets such that, under Pε(., .), any of the sets can be reached from any x ∈ X with a
probability bounded below by a strictly positive number. Such a partition is:
X = X0 ∪Xk ∪Xk+1 . . . ∪Xn
where for i = k, . . . , n:
Xi = {x ∈ X : |I(x)| = i}
and
X0 = {x ∈ X : |I(x)| < k}
Bounds can be found for the transition probabilities between these sets. Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984) style tree arguments can then be used. The ‘flow’ of probability mass
from Xi to Xi−1 for i = k+1, . . . , n, and from Xk to X0 can be shown to be of order ε,
so a tree of order εn−k+1 rooted at X0 can be constructed. Any tree not rooted at X0
must include an edge leaving X0 of order ε
k. Taking limits of the invariant measures
20If p = 2ς, from (0, 1) it takes an order ε3 event to move to the basin of attraction of (1, 0), but
from (ξ, 1− ξ), ξ ∈ (0, ς), an order ε2 event is all that is required.
21Assumption 4 can then be seen to be satisfied by a similar argument to that in Section 5.1 (see
Footnote 18).
22
then gives the conclusion that all probability mass in the limit is concentrated in X0
and therefore, by Proposition 3, on 0n.
Proposition 11. In the example of Section 2.2 the unique stochastically stable state
is 0n.
Given the simple nature of the counterexamples in Section 4, a similar analysis
to the above can be carried out. In Example 4.1, W0 can be partitioned into states
that converge within C × C × C, those that converge within B × B × B, and those
that attain x∗0. In Example 4.2, Wk can be partitioned into states whose first digit is
1 and states whose first digit is not 1. In Example 4.3, Wk can be partitioned into
the two areas on either side of the dotted line in Figure 2. In Example 4.4, Wk can
be partitioned into states with y > 0 and those with y ≤ 0.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has demonstrated how commonly used stochastic stability methods can
be applied to settings with infinite state spaces, corresponding to situations in which
economic agents choose from infinite strategy sets. It includes sufficient conditions for
the straightforward application of existing results in the literature to such settings.
Moreover, the analysis of the complications that can arise with general state spaces
aids understanding of the problems of which one should be aware when applying ideas
of robustness to random perturbations to processes which do not satisfy all of our
conditions.
Another approach when seeking to find stochastically stable states for games with
infinite strategy sets is to discretize the strategy space and the transition kernel. This
is not always simple and can lead to problems such as the absence of simple closed
form best response functions and nonexistence of equilibrium. Difficulties can be
met when passing to the limit of any discretization as it becomes fine. Moreover,
examples in this paper show that any discretization satisfying plausible criteria can
lead to the selection of different equilibria to those selected when the analysis is carried
out directly on the original state space and process. Sometimes it may be better to
analyze stochastic stability whilst remaining in a non-finite world. This paper gives
tools with which to aid that endeavour.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Definition 7. A measure ϕ on B(X) is an irreducibility measure and Φε is ϕ-
irreducible if for all x ∈ X, whenever ϕ(A) > 0, there exists some t > 0, possibly
depending on both A and x, such that P tε(x,A) > 0.
Definition 8. A set A ∈ B(X) is petite if there exists a nontrivial22 measure ν and
a probability distribution a on Z+ such that ∀x ∈ A,∑
t
a(t)P tε(x, .) ≥ ν(.)
A ∈ B(X) is νt˜-small if there exists such ν, a, with a(t˜) = 1 for some t˜ ∈ Z+.
Definition 9. The process is said to be strongly aperiodic if there exists a ν1-small
set A ∈ B(X) with ν1(A) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. GM(.) is an irreducibility measure on B(X) as for any A ∈
B(X) with GM(A) > 0 we have Pε(x,A) ≥ εMGM(A) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Letting
a(1) = 1, ν(.) = εMGM(.) we see that the set X is petite as for all x ∈ X, Pε(x, .) ≥
εMGM(.) = ν(.). As X is the entire state space, τX := min{t ≥ 1 : Φtε ∈ X} ≡ 1.
Combined with irreducibility and petiteness of X this implies the existence of a unique
invariant probability measure piε for Φε.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Take some A ∈ B(X) with GM(A) > 0. For all x ∈ A,
Pε(x,A) ≥ εMGM(A) > 0. Letting ν1(.) = εMGM(.), we see that A is ν1-small.
Therefore the process is strongly aperiodic. This and the uniqueness and finiteness
of piε imply the result.
25
Proof of Proposition 3. Let λ(.) be a probability measure on B(X). By Assumption
2 and the bounded convergence theorem there exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K,∫
X
P k(x,A)λ(dx) <
η
2
22A measure which is not everywhere zero.
23Meyn and Tweedie (1994), Theorem 3.2.
24This implies Lemma 2 of Schenk-Hoppe´ (2000). Similarly, Proposition 3 and its corollary imply
Lemma 3 of Schenk-Hoppe´ (2000).
25Meyn and Tweedie (2009), Theorem 13.0.1.
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so for k > K,
∫
X
P kε (x,A)λ(dx) =
∫
X
∫
X
Pε(x, dy)P
k−1
ε (y,A)λ(dx) =
∫
X
∫
X
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)
P (x, dy)P k−1ε (y,A)λ(dx)+. . .
=
∫
X
∫
X
. . .
∫
X
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)k
P (x, dy1)P (y1, dy2) . . . P (yk−2, dyk−1)P (yk−1, A)λ(dx) + . . .
=
∫
X
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)k
P k(x,A)λ(dx) + . . . <
∫
X
P k(x,A)λ(dx) +
∫
X
1−(1− M∑
i=1
εi
)kλ(dx)
=
∫
X
P k(x,A)λ(dx) + 1−
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)k
<
η
2
+ 1−
(
1−
M∑
i=1
εi
)k
which is less than η for small enough ε as limε→0 εi = 0 for all i.
Proof of Corollary 1. For n ∈ N, let
Bn = {x ∈ X : d(x,Λ) > 2−n}, B¯n = {x ∈ X : d(x,Λ) ≥ 2−n}.
For all n ∈ N, B¯n is closed, so B¯n = cl(B¯n). As B¯n ∩ Λ = ∅, Proposition 3 implies
piε(B¯n) → 0 as ε → 0. So, as Bn ⊆ B¯n, piε(Bn) → 0 as ε → 0. Bn is open, so by the
definition of weak convergence, it must be that pi(Bn) = 0. As Λ is closed, we have
that
X \ Λ =
∞⋃
n=1
Bn, and therefore pi(X \ Λ) = pi
( ∞⋃
n=1
Bn
)
≤
∞∑
n=1
pi(Bn) = 0
So the only states in X which can have positive probability under pi are in Λ.
To aid conciseness, denote G0(x, .) := P (x, .) and GM(x, .) := GM(.). Denote, for
qt ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M}, t = 1, . . . , T ,
G(q1,...,qT )(x, .) :=
∫
X
Gq1(x, dy1)
∫
X
Gq2(y1, dy2) . . .
∫
X
GqT−1(yT−2, dyT−1)GqT (yT−1, .)
(A.1)
Observe that for small ε, 1/2 < (1− ε− . . .− εM) < 1. For the rest of this section, we
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assume that this holds. We have
Pε(x, .) ≤
M∑
q=0
εqGq(x, .) < 2Pε(x, .)
and similarly,
P Tε (x, .) =
∫
X
Pε(x, dy1)
∫
X
Pε(y1, dy2) . . .
∫
X
Pε(yT−2, dyT−1)Pε(yT−1, .) ≤∑
q1,...,qT
∫
X
εq1Gq1(x, dy1)
∫
X
εq2Gq2(y1, dy2) . . .
∫
X
εqT−1GqT−1(yT−2, dyT−1)ε
qTGqT (yT−1, .)
=
∑
q1,...,qT
εq1+...+qTG(q1,...,qT )(x, .) < 2
TP Tε (x, .). (A.2)
Lemma 1. For x ∈ X, A ∈ B(X), T ∈ N+, let r = min{q1+. . .+qT |G(q1,...,qT )(x,A) >
0}. Then, for some l > 0 independent of ε,
lεr < P Tε (x,A) ≤ (M + 1)T εr.
Proof. Considering a term in (A.2) such that q˜1 + . . .+ q˜T ≤ r, we have
P Tε (x,A) >
1
2T
G(q˜1,...,q˜T )(x,A) ε
q˜1+...+q˜T ≥ l εr, for l = 1
2T
G(q˜1,...,q˜T )(x,A).
If q1 + . . . + qT ≥ r for all strictly positive terms in (A.2), then as there are at most
(M + 1)T such terms,
P Tε (x,A) ≤
∑
q1,...,qT
εq1+...+qT ≤ (M + 1)T εr.
Lemma 2. (i) x∗j ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∀x∗k ∈ Λ, V (x∗k, x∗j) <∞.
(ii) x∗j /∈ A =⇒ ∀x∗k ∈ A, V (x∗k, x∗j) =∞.
(iii) x∗j ∈ A =⇒ ∀δ, x ∈ X, Prx(τW δj <∞) = 1.
Proof. Let Bj be as in Definition 6. Let x
∗
j ∈ A. Then GM(Bj) > 0. Let x∗i be such
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that V (x∗k, x
∗
i ) <∞ for all x∗k ∈ Λ. Let
BTδnj := {x ∈ Bj : ∀t ≥ T, P tε(x,W δj ) > 1/2tn}.
Fix δ > 0. P t1ε (x,Wj) > 0 for some t1 implies that for large enough t2, n,
P t2ε (x,W
δ
j ) ≥
(
1
2
)t2−t1 ∫
Wj
P t1ε (x, dy)P
t2−t1(y,W δj ) >
(
1
2
)t2
P t1ε (x,Wj) >
1
2t2
1
n
,
where the second inequality comes from bounded convergence as Assumption 2 implies
that for y ∈ Wj, P t2−t1(.,W δj )→ 1 pointwise as t2 →∞. So Bj = ∪T∈N+ ∪n∈N+ BTδnj ,
and for some T , n, for all x ∈ X, Pε(x,BTδnj ) > εMGM(BTδnj ) > 0. For x ∈ BTδnj ,
P Tε (x,W
δ
j ) > 1/2Tn. Combining, for all x ∈ X, P T+1ε (x,W δj ) > εMGM(BTδnj )1/2Tn > 0.
For x∗k ∈ Λ, by the definition of V (x∗k, x∗j) it follows that V (x∗k, x∗j) ≤M(T + 1) <∞.
The uniform lower bound on P T+1ε (.,W
δ
j ) implies that τW δ <∞ with probability 1.
Let δ = δji from the definition of Property C. For all x ∈ W δjij , by Property C
and V (x∗j , x
∗
i ) <∞, there exists t such that P tε(x,Wi) > 0, so BTδjinj ⊆ Bi, implying
GM(Bi) > 0 and x
∗
i ∈ A. By contraposition, if x∗i /∈ A, it must be that V (x∗j , x∗i ) =∞.
Definition 10. Fix δ¯, Tδ¯+, so that for all x
∗
k, x
∗
j ∈ A, x ∈ W δ¯k ,
(i) @t : P tε(x,Wj) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )−1), (ii) δ¯ < δkj,
(iii) δ¯, Tδ¯+ satisfy Assumption 4,
(iv) ∃l¯ > 0 : G(q1,...,qTkj )(x,Wj \ Fδ¯(Tδ¯+)) > l¯,
for some q1, . . . , qTkj , q1 + . . .+ qTkj = V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j).
where (i) can be satisfied due to the definition of V − and δkj is as in the definition
of Property C. As by Property C, for all x ∈ W δ¯k , there exists q1, . . . , qTkj , q1 + . . . +
qTkj = V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j), such that G(q1,...,qTkj )(x,Wj) > l for some l > 0, a large enough Tδ¯+
guarantees (iv). Further define:
T := max
k,j:x∗k,x
∗
j∈A
Tkj + Tδ¯+.
Lemma 3. For all t ≥ T , x∗k, x∗j ∈ A, there exists l > 0, ε¯ such that for all x ∈ W δ¯k ,
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ε < ε¯,
lεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ) < P tε(x,W
δ¯
j ) ≤ (M + 1)tεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ). (A.3)
Proof. For x ∈ W δ¯k , from Definition 10(iv) and Lemma 1,
P
Tkj
ε (x,Wj \ Fδ¯(Tδ¯+)) > l¯ εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ).
For x ∈ Wj \ Fδ¯(Tδ¯+),
P
t−Tkj
ε (x,W
δ¯
j ) > (1/2)
t−TkjP t−Tkj(x,W δ¯j ) = (1/2)
t−Tkj ,
so we have the first inequality in (A.3). Consider the expansion of P t(x,W δ¯j ) in the
form (A.2). If there exists a strictly positive term with q1 + . . .+ qt ≤ V (x∗k, x∗j)− 1,
then by Lemma 1 we have P t(x,W δ¯j ) > lε
V (x∗k,x
∗
j )−1. So P t(x,W δ¯j ) ∈ Ω(εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j )−1),
contradicting Definition 10(i) and Property C. So all strictly positive terms have
q1 + . . .+ qt ≥ V (x∗k, x∗j) and by Lemma 1 we have P t(x,W δ¯j ) ≤ (M + 1)tεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ).
Define Φˆε as the Markov process with kernel Pˆε(., .) = P
T
ε (., .). This process also
has invariant measure piε. Define:
τˆA(k) := min{t > τˆA(k − 1) : Φˆtε ∈ A}; τˆA(0) = 0.
Let W¯ δ =
⋃
i:x∗i∈AW
δ
i and define Φ˜ε as the process Φˆε only observed when it lies
in W¯ δ¯, Φ˜tε = Φˆ
τˆ
W¯ δ¯
(t)
ε . It follows from the argument in the proof of Lemma 2 that
Prx(τˆW¯ δ¯(t) <∞) = 1. Then the invariant measure of Φ˜ε is given by:
p˜iε(.) =
piε(.)
piε(W¯ δ¯)
.
Denote:
APˆ
t
ε(x,B) := Prx(Φˆ
t
ε ∈ B, τˆA(1) ≥ t); x ∈ X; A,B ∈ B(X).
The kernel of Φ˜ε is given by:
P˜ε(x,A) =
∞∑
t=1
W¯ δ¯ Pˆ
t
ε(x,A), A ∈ B(W¯ δ¯).
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Lemma 4. There exists ε¯ such that for all ε < ε¯, x /∈ Fδ¯(Tδ¯+),
Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT ) < ε
t
2 . (A.4)
Proof. For x /∈ Fδ¯(Tδ¯+),
Prx(τˆW δ¯ > 1) = 1− Pˆε(x,W δ¯) = 1− PTε (x,W δ¯) ≤ 1− (1− ε− . . .− εM )TPT (x,W δ¯)
≤ 1− (1−Mε)T < 1− (1− 2T 2Mε) = (2T 2Mε) < ε 12 , therefore
Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT ) = Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t− 1|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT ) · Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT , τˆW δ¯ > t− 1)
≤ Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t− 1|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT ) · sup
y/∈Fδ¯(Tδ¯+)
Pry(τˆW δ¯ > 1)
< Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t− 1|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > tT ) · ε
1
2 ≤ . . . < ε t2 .
Lemma 5. For all x∗i ∈ Λ, there exists ε¯ such that for all ε < ε¯, x ∈ W δ¯i ,
Prx(τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) ≤ t˜) ≤ t˜(M + 1)t˜εV¯i . (A.5)
Proof.
Prx(τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) ≤ t˜) ≤
t˜∑
t=1
P tε(x, Fδ¯(Tδ¯+)) ≤
t˜∑
t=1
(M + 1)tεV¯i ≤ t˜(M + 1)t˜εV¯i .
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1 and Assumption 4.
Lemma 6. Let t˜ > 2 maxx∗k,x∗j∈A V (x
∗
k, x
∗
j). Then, for all x
∗
k, x
∗
j ∈ A, there exists
l > 0, ε¯ such that for all x ∈ W δ¯k , ε < ε¯,
lεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ) < P˜ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) < (t˜(M + 1)
t˜T + 1 + t˜T (M + 1)t˜T )εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ). (A.6)
Proof.
P˜ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) =
∞∑
t=1
W¯ δ¯ Pˆ
t
ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) > Pˆε(x,W
δ¯
j ) = P
T
ε (x,W
δ¯
j ) ≥ lεV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j )
where the final inequality uses Lemma 3. Note that x ∈ W δ¯k , x∗i /∈ A implies
P tε(x,W
δ¯
i ) = 0 for all t, hence Prx(τˆW¯ δ¯ > t˜) = Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t˜). Furthermore, us-
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ing the law of total probability, Lemmas 3, 4, 5, and Property C, we have
P˜ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) =
∞∑
t=1
W¯ δ¯ Pˆ
t
ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) ≤
t˜∑
t=1
W¯ δ¯ Pˆ
t
ε(x,W
δ¯
j ) + Prx(τˆW¯ δ¯ > t˜)
<
t˜∑
t=1
Pˆ tε(x,W
δ¯
j ) + Prx(τˆW δ¯ > t˜|τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) > t˜T ) + Prx(τFδ¯(Tδ¯+) ≤ t˜T )
< t˜(M + 1)t˜T εV (x
∗
k,x
∗
j ) + ε
t˜
2 + t˜T (M + 1)t˜T εV¯k
≤ t˜(M + 1)t˜T εV (x∗k,x∗j ) + εV (x∗k,x∗j ) + t˜T (M + 1)t˜T εV (x∗k,x∗j )
Lemma 7 (Freidlin and Wentzell, 1984, Lemmas 3.1, 3.2). Assume there exists a
partition of X into finitely many disjoint sets {Xi|i ∈ L}, |L| = ν, such that, for all
i, j ∈ L,
∃cij > 0 s.t. inf
x∈Xi
Pε(x,Xj) ≥ cij.
For given invariant measure piε(.), let:
pij :=
1
piε(Xi)
∫
Xi
Pε(x,Xj)piε(dx)
For g ∈ G(i), define:
vol(g) :=
∏
(j→k)∈g
pjk; Qi :=
∑
g∈G(i)
vol(g)
then:
piε(Xi) =
Qi∑ν
j=1Qj
.
Subsequent proofs use the following additional items of Bachmann-Landau asymp-
totic notation, which express the ideas of f being bounded by g above, and both above
and below respectively:
f(ε) ∈ O(g(ε))⇔ ∃k > 0, ε¯ s.t. ∀ ε < ε¯, |f(ε)| ≤ kg(ε)
f(ε) ∈ Θ(g(ε))⇔ ∃k1, k2 > 0, ε¯ s.t. ∀ ε < ε¯, k1g(ε) ≤ |f(ε)| ≤ k2g(ε)
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let L˜ := {j ∈ L : x∗j ∈ A}. Let V˜(.) be as V(.), only defined
on L˜ instead of on L. Partition W¯ δ¯ into {W δ¯i }i∈L˜ and define, for i, j ∈ L˜:
p˜ε,ij :=
1
p˜iε(W δ¯i )
∫
W δ¯i
P˜ε(x,W
δ¯
j )p˜iε(dx)
For x∗i , x
∗
j ∈ A, the bounds on P˜ε(x,W δj ) in Lemma 6 imply that p˜ε,ij ∈ Θ(εV (x
∗
i ,x
∗
j )).
Define vol(.) and Qi as in Lemma 7 with pij = p˜ε,ij. Note that for j /∈ A, by Lemma
2 and the definition of A, V(j) =∞, piε(W δ¯j ) = 0.
i ∈ Lmin ⇔ V(i) ≤ V(j) ∀j ∈ L⇔ V˜(i) ≤ V˜(j) ∀j ∈ L˜
⇔ ∃g′ ∈ G(i) : vol(g′) ∈ Θ(εV˜(i)) and ∀j ∈ L˜, ∀g ∈ G(j), vol(g) ∈ O(εV˜(i))
⇔ ∃V˜(i) ∈ N0 : Qi ∈ Θ(εV˜(i)),
∑
j∈L˜
Qj ∈ Θ(εV˜(i))
⇔ lim
ε→0
p˜iε(W
δ¯
i ) > 0⇔ lim
ε→0
piε(W
δ¯
i ) = pi(W
δ¯
i ) > 0⇔ pi(x∗i ) > 0.
Lemma 8. Under Condition (i) of Proposition 5, if Tδ defined as in Assumption 2
is independent of x, then for all x∗k ∈ Λ, there exists δ˜ > 0 such that W δ˜k is open.
Proof. Choose δˆ < 1/2 mini,j∈L d(x∗i , x
∗
j). Then by Condition (i), as P (x
∗
k, x
∗
k) = 1,
∃ δTδˆ−1 : ∀x ∈ BδTδˆ−1(x
∗
k), P (x,Bδˆ(x
∗
k)) > ξBδˆ(x∗k),x∗k > 0.
Similarly,
∃ δTδˆ−2 : ∀x ∈ BδTδˆ−2(x
∗
k), P (x,BδT
δˆ
−1(x
∗
k)) > ξBδT
δˆ
−1 (x
∗
k),x
∗
k
> 0.
Continue in this manner until we obtain
∃ δ0 : ∀x ∈ Bδ0(x∗k), P (x,Bδ1(x∗k)) > ξBδ1 (x∗k),x∗k > 0.
Combining the above, for x ∈ Bδ0(x∗k),
P Tδˆ(x,Bδˆ(x
∗
k)) > ξBδˆ(x∗k),x∗k
Tδˆ−1∏
m=1
ξBδm (x∗k),x∗k > 0.
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Now, by way of contradiction, assume there does not exist δ˜ such that W δ˜k is open.
Then Bδ˜(x
∗
k) 6⊆ Wk for all δ˜ > 0. So there exists x0 ∈ Bδ0(x∗k), x0 /∈ Wk. This implies
that P Tδˆ(x0,Wk) = 0. However, δˆ was chosen so that Bδˆ(x
∗
k) ∩W δˆi = ∅ for all i 6= k.
Therefore P Tδˆ(x0, Bδˆ(x
∗
k)) > 0 implies that P
Tδˆ(x0,W
δˆ) < 1, contradicting the bound
in the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5. We know from Condition (iii) that there exists T1 such that
P T1ε (x
∗
k,Wj) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )). Let δ˜ satisfy Condition (ii). Choose T2 large enough that
P T1ε (x
∗
k,Wj \Fδ˜(T2)) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )). For all z ∈ Wj \Fδ˜(T2), P T2(z,W δ˜j ) = 1. So, for
T = T1 + T2, P
T
ε (x
∗
k,W
δ˜
j ) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )). Expanding P Tε (x
∗
k,W
δ˜
j ) as in (A.2), there
must be a strictly positive term in the expansion such that q1 + . . .+ qT ≤ V −(x∗k, x∗j)
or Lemma 1 gives a contradiction to P Tε (x
∗
k,W
δ˜
j ) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )). Define
Y0 := {x∗k}, Yt :=
⋃
y∈Yt−1
suppGqt(y, .)
and rewrite some strictly positive term in the (A.2) expansion of P Tε (x
∗
k,W
δ˜
j ) that
corresponds to q1 + . . .+ qT ≤ V −(x∗k, x∗j) as
εq1+...+qT
∫
Y1
Gq1(x, dy1)
∫
Y2
Gq2(y1, dy2) . . .
∫
YT−1
GqT−1(yT−2, dyT−1)GqT (yT−1, YT∩W δ˜j ).
Therefore, there exists yˆT−1 ∈ YT−1 such that
GqT (yˆT−1,W
δ˜
j ) ≥ GqT (yˆT−1, YT ∩W δ˜j ) > 0.
Note that W δ˜j ⊆ W δ˜j , so GqT (yˆT−1,W δ˜j ) > 0. AsW δ˜j is open, we know from Condition
(i) that
∃ δW δ˜j yˆT−1 : ∀ zT−1 ∈ BδWδ˜j yˆT−1 (yˆT−1) =: ET−1, GqT (zT−1,W
δ˜
j ) > ξW δ˜j yˆT−1 .
As yˆT−1 ∈ suppGqT−1(yˆT−2, .) for some yˆT−2 ∈ YT−2, by the definition of support and
that ET−1 is open, it must be that GqT−1(yˆT−2, ET−1) > 0, so by Condition (i)
∃ δET−1yˆT−2 : ∀ zT−2 ∈ BδET−1yˆT−2 (yˆT−2) =: ET−2, GqT−1(zT−2, ET−1) > ξET−1yˆT−2 .
Continuing in this manner, obtain sets Et, until we obtain E0 such that for all z ∈
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BδE1x∗k
(x∗k) =: E0, Gq1(z, E1) > ξE1x∗k . So, for z ∈ E0,
P Tε (z,W δ˜j ) ≥
∫
E1
Pε(z, dy1)
∫
E2
Pε(y1, dy2) . . .
∫
ET−1
Pε(yT−2, dyT−1)Pε(yT−1,W δ˜j )
≥ εq1ξE1x · εq2ξE2yˆ1 · εq3ξE3yˆ2 . . . · εqT−1ξET−1yˆT−2 · εqT ξW δ˜j yˆT−1
= εq1+...+qT
T−1∏
i=0
ξEi+1yˆi (writing yˆ0 = x
∗
k and ET =W δ˜j )
≥
(
T−1∏
i=0
ξEi+1yˆi
)
εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j ).
This shows that for all x ∈ W δE1x∗kk , P Tε (x,W δ˜j ) ≥ lεV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j ) for some l > 0. This
implies V (x∗k, x
∗
j) ∈ Ω(εV
−(x∗k,x
∗
j )). That is, V (x∗k, x
∗
j) ≤ V −(x∗k, x∗j). As V (x∗k, x∗j) ≥
V −(x∗k, x
∗
j) by definition, we are done.
Proof of Proposition 8. Assume the statement is incorrect for some ξ > 0. There
must be an infinite sequence of stable states {x∗(k)}k corresponding to increasing
values of k such that none of these stable states are within ξ of any Nash equilibrium.
As the sequence is bounded it contains a convergent subsequence. Restrict attention
to such a subsequence. Denote its limit by x¯∗. As x¯∗ is not a Nash equilibrium at
least one of the actions played is not a best response to the true distribution of play.
Assume that action i is one of these actions. x¯∗i > 0. Then there exists k, η > 0, such
that for all k > k, x∗i (k) > η. Note that as x
∗(k) is a stable state, BRi(x∗(k)) = x∗i (k).
There exists γ such that for all x such that |x − x¯∗| < γ, best responses to the
true distribution of x are a subset of the best responses to the true distribution of x¯∗.
Define fk(σ) as the distribution of samples σ at x
∗(k). As k →∞, fk(σ) approaches
in distribution the probability measure with point mass on x¯∗. This implies:
∀η ∃k¯ : ∀k > k¯,
∑
σ/∈Bγ(x¯∗)
fk(σ) < η,
which implies:
BRi(x
∗(k)) < η.
and we have a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 9. Assume that xNEi = 1. Let x
t be such that xti = 1 − ξ, ξ ∈
(0, 1). There exists s ∈ R such that if i is not a unique best response to the strategy
σ then:∑
j 6=i
σj ≥ s.
The proportion of players changing strategy who will sample such a σ is:
ξ˜ =
k∑
j=dkse
(
k
j
)
ξj(1− ξ)k−j ∈ Θ(ξdkse).
Assuming k is large enough that dkse ≥ 2, there exists ξ¯ such that:
∀ ξ < ξ¯, ξ˜ < ξ.
So for any xt ∈ Bξ¯(xNE) we have that xti = 1− ξ for some ξ < ξ¯ and:
xt+1i ≥ (1− α)xti + α(1− ξ˜) = (1− α)(1− ξ) + α(1− ξ˜) > 1− ξ = xti.
So we have convergence to xNE from an open ball centered on xNE, so xNE ∈ Λ.
This open ball is reached with positive probability from anywhere in the state space
so xNE ∈ A.
Proof of Proposition 11. For i = k + 1, . . . , n, x ∈ Xi:
Mε > Pε(x,Xi−1) ≥ ε i
n
1
xmax
,
therefore pi,i−1 ∈ Θ(ε). Also, for x ∈ Xk:
Mε > Pε(x,X0) ≥ ε k
n
1
xmax
,
and pk,0 ∈ Θ(ε). So there exists a 0-graph g˜ with vol(g˜) ∈ Θ(εn−k+1). Therefore
Q0 ∈ Θ(εn−k+1). For x ∈ X0, i 6= 0:
Pε(x,Xi) ∈ O(εk)
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so any i-graph, i 6= 0, has vol(g˜) ∈ O(ε(n−k)+k) = O(εn). Therefore Qi ∈ O(εn).
Using the formula for piε(Xi) in Lemma 7, we see that piε(Xi) → 0 as ε → 0 for all
i 6= 0. So piε(X0)→ 1 as ε→ 0 and by Proposition 3, piε approaches the distribution
with point mass on 0n.
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